Operation Trojan

Reference. Reports what the sources say. States no conclusion of ours.

Edition label: 2026-11

Secondary-source summary. This page summarises published books and memoirs (Whitney Webb, Victor Ostrovsky, Gordon Thomas and Martin Dillon, Ari Ben-Menashe, Israel Shahak). Allegations are attributed to their authors and are not independently established by primary records held in this archive. Not everything on this page is footnoted. Our citation check covers the main text, but not headings, the lists of related entries and sources, or open questions, which may state facts without a footnote. Check the footnoted text or the source before relying on them.

Definition: Victor Ostrovsky alleges that Mossad planted a communications device in Tripoli on February 17–18, 1986 to fabricate intercepted messages.1 His memoir describes a signals intelligence (SIGINT) deception, but does not independently establish the operation or its claimed causal role in the subsequent U.S. air strike.2

Source of disclosure

Ostrovsky, Victor. The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad’s Secret Agenda. First edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. ISBN 0-06-017635-0. Held electronic version., Chapter 15, PDF pp. 108–111.3 Ostrovsky presents the account through his own narrative and a conversation with a source.4 The memoir does not independently authenticate that source’s identity or establish the operational and factional allegations as fact.

Operational architecture

The device

Ostrovsky describes a Trojan as a communications device receiving prerecorded transmissions from an Israeli naval ship and rebroadcasting them on another frequency.5 He says placement near the expected source was intended to deceive location checks; this does not establish immunity to triangulation or a connection to the separately described temporary relay stations (TRS) for listening devices.6

The TRS glossary describes planted or air-dropped relays for listening devices; it does not identify them as Trojan variants.7

Delivery operation (Feb 17–18, 1986)

Ostrovsky attributes delivery of the device to the following Israeli units; the listed roles are part of his uncorroborated account.8

Ostrovsky identifies two Israeli missile boats and gives the following descriptions of them.11

In Ostrovsky’s account, the boats headed for the Sicilian Channel and passed just outside Libyan territorial waters north of Tripoli and slowed to about four knots while visible on radar from Tripoli and Lampedusa.14

According to Ostrovsky, twelve commandos disembarked from the missile boats and eight then continued toward shore in wet submersibles while the speedboats waited offshore.15 The figures below describe craft capacity, not additional personnel.16

Ostrovsky writes that eight commandos reached the beach and carried a dark green cylinder inland, with two men needed to carry it.19

Ostrovsky describes a Mossad combatant posing as a driver repairing a flat tire on the coastal highway.20 In his account, four commandos rode into Tripoli in the van and four stayed near the beach to secure an escape route.21

Target apartment

According to Ostrovsky, the target apartment was on the top floor of a five-story building on Al Jamhuriyh Street, less than three blocks from the Bab al Azizia barracks.22 He describes a six-month rental term with rent paid in advance, a north-facing antenna and a self-destruct mechanism; no rental or operational record independently corroborates this account here.23

Air support

According to Ostrovsky, Israeli fighters refuelled south of Crete on standby to provide air support for an escape if needed; he does not describe the fighters extracting the commandos.24

Exploitation phase (March–April 1986)

Ostrovsky alleges that, by the end of March 1986, U.S. listeners intercepted fabricated broadcasts from the device and interpreted them as Libyan orders.25 He says Mossad reports reinforced the broadcasts, while similarities between the two made the French and Spanish suspicious.26 No intercept record independently verifies this account here.27

Per Ostrovsky:28

Ostrovsky reports that the French and Spanish questioned the sudden stream of intercepted messages and the similarity to Mossad reports, and inferred that the messages were fabricated.29 This is an unquoted paraphrase of his account, not independent confirmation of that inference.30

Ostrovsky claims the intercepts were fabricated;31 that claim is not independently corroborated here. Ostrovsky reports the French and Spanish reasoning “that it must not be the Libyans who did it” and writes, “The French and the Spanish were right.”32 The later German criminal judgment is in tension with that endorsement: rejecting all appeals in 2004, the Federal Court of Justice records the Berlin Regional Court’s findings that Libyan agencies commissioned the Libyan People’s Bureau in East Berlin to attack American facilities in Germany, that the Bureau set the target and supplied the explosive, and that its two leading staff, both also members of the Libyan secret service, led the planning; the Federal Court of Justice describes the Regional Court’s account of the attack itself as minimum findings on an unusually difficult and partly sparse evidential basis.33 The judgment does not address the intercepts Ostrovsky says were fabricated.34

Outcome: April 14, 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya

Ostrovsky describes aircraft arriving from British bases and Mediterranean carriers.35 Detailed aircraft totals and bomb tonnage are omitted here because the memoir’s breakdown has not been independently reconciled.36

Ostrovsky lists Tripoli international airport, Bab al Azizia barracks, Sidi Bilal naval base, Benghazi and Benine airfield as targets.39 His target list does not corroborate the alleged device placement.40

Ostrovsky reports approximately forty Libyan civilian casualties and two U.S. aircrew deaths; these figures remain attributed to the memoir.41 [Identifying detail of a minor withheld.] He also reports French refusal of overflight permission and a bomb hitting the French embassy; the cited passage supplies no precise added flight duration.42

Per Ostrovsky, the strike had three consequences:43

  1. Derailed the hostage-release deal for American hostages held in Lebanon — “thus preserving the Hizballah (Party of God) as the number one enemy in the eyes of the West.”44
  2. Sent “a message to the entire Arab world, telling them exactly where the United States stood regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.”45
  3. “Boosted the Mossad’s image of itself, since it was they who, by ingenious sleight of hand, had prodded the United States to do what was right.”46

Ostrovsky reports that three hostages were killed after the raid, including one American, Peter Kilburn.47 His attribution of responsibility is not independently corroborated here.48

Evidence and uncertainty

The memoir presents Trojan as alleged intelligence manipulation.49 Its operational detail does not independently establish the operation or institutional capability, and its separate TRS glossary does not establish a common device family. The comparisons that follow describe patterns within the memoir’s allegations, not independently established operations.50

Ostrovsky later describes two other alleged operations:5152

Connections

Open Questions

Sources