Operation Brush-Fire
Reference. Reports what the sources say. States no conclusion of ours.
Edition label: 2026-11
Secondary-source summary. This page summarises published books and memoirs (Whitney Webb, Victor Ostrovsky, Gordon Thomas and Martin Dillon, Ari Ben-Menashe, Israel Shahak). Allegations are attributed to their authors and are not independently established by primary records held in this archive. Not everything on this page is footnoted. Our citation check covers the main text, but not headings, the lists of related entries and sources, or open questions, which may state facts without a footnote. Check the footnoted text or the source before relying on them.
Definition: Victor Ostrovsky’s 1994 memoir alleges that Operation Brush-Fire was a Mossad psychological-warfare (LAP) campaign intended to draw the United States into conflict with Iraq.1 Its operations and causal impact are not independently established here. The memoir says the plan for the alleged Al-Iskandariah attack was to take position on Wednesday, August 23, 1989, and strike the next day.2 The memoir places the Bull killing eight days after Bazoft’s execution,3 which Hansard records on March 15, 1990.4
Source
Ostrovsky, Victor. The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad’s Secret Agenda. First edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. ISBN 0-06-017635-0. Held electronic version., Chapter 27, PDF p. 229: Ostrovsky attributes to a source the account of a campaign intended to draw the United States into military involvement in the Middle East, especially the Gulf.5 This is a paraphrase of the memoir’s operation-name passage.6
Key operational framing
Per Ostrovsky, the Mossad’s strategic calculation treated Saddam Hussein as an asset rather than a target: “The Mossad regarded Saddam Hussein as their biggest asset in the area, since he was totally irrational as far as international politics was concerned, and was therefore all the more likely to make a stupid move that the Mossad could take advantage of.”7 Ostrovsky writes that what the Mossad really feared was that Iraq’s army would fall into the hands of a leader “who might be more palatable to the West and still be a threat to Israel.”8
The public-vs-private posture:
- Publicly, in Ostrovsky’s account: the alleged psychological-warfare campaign portrayed Saddam Hussein as a danger to the world, using reports about Iraqi violence and weapons programs.9
- Privately, in Ostrovsky’s account: Mossad passed warnings about threats to Saddam’s life and regime to his intelligence service, the Muchabarat.10 No contemporaneous intelligence record independently supports this allegation here.11
This public-private contrast is Ostrovsky’s interpretation of the alleged campaign; it does not establish an independently verified operational pattern.12
The five components in detail
The following summarizes Ostrovsky’s allegations, which have not been independently corroborated here.13 See also Ostrovsky Operation Brush Fire 1.14
- November 1988: Ostrovsky alleges that Mossad told the Israeli foreign office to stop talks with the Iraqis about a peace front and manipulated the result to make Iraq appear unwilling to negotiate.15
- January 1989: Ostrovsky alleges that Mossad used contacts in media, advocacy organizations and Congress to portray Saddam as a threat.16 His claim about paid congressional support is not independently established here and identifies no member.17
- August 1989: Ostrovsky describes an alleged attack on the Al-Iskandariah explosives factory by Matkal personnel and naval commandos.18 His account places positioning on Wednesday, August 23, followed by the attack the next day, and says the explosion was used for publicity.19
- March 15, 1990: Iraq executed Farzad Bazoft, as recorded in Hansard.20 Ostrovsky separately alleges that an exchange offer and withdrawal by Mossad helped frame him as an Israeli spy; that causal claim is not independently corroborated here.21
- March 1990: Ostrovsky alleges that a Kidon team killed Gerald Bull in Brussels and that contacts in the Belgian police were available to assist.22 The memoir says the murder was unsolved at the time of writing, and places it eight days after Bazoft’s execution.23
Alleged Mossad support for the Barzani family
Ostrovsky calls the photographs of Kurdish victims of an Iraqi gas attack real, but argues, citing Mossad arms and advisers sent to the Barzani family’s camps, that the attack “could hardly be called an attack on their own people.”24 That argument does not establish that the civilian victims were combatants or intelligence proxies.25
The civilian deaths must be distinguished from the memoir’s separate allegation about support for guerrillas; that allegation does not reclassify the victims.26
Evidentiary limits
The comparison with Operation Trojan is between two narratives in the same memoir.27 Neither independently establishes Mossad’s ability to cause U.S. military action.28
- Ostrovsky alleges that Trojan involved fabricated signals intelligence intended to prompt a U.S. strike on Libya; the operation and causal connection are uncorroborated here.29
- Ostrovsky alleges that Brush-Fire combined diplomacy, publicity and physical operations to encourage Western action against Iraq; that account does not establish the cause of the later coalition response.30
The alleged Brush-Fire campaign cannot independently corroborate the memoir’s separate Madrid plot allegation.31 Similarities between accounts from the same author are not independent evidence.32
Connections
- Ostrovsky Operation Brush Fire 1 — related discussion of the same memoir account; the operational roles in these connections are Ostrovsky’s attributions.33
- LAP — psychological warfare, as identified in Ostrovsky’s Brush-Fire account34
- Operation Trojan — separate alleged 1986 operation in the memoir; no independently established operational continuity.35
- Gerald Bull and Farzad Bazoft — men whose deaths Ostrovsky recounts;36 on this page’s reading, victims in his account, not operational personnel.
- Matkal — Ostrovsky places a Matkal contingent, with unnamed naval commandos, in the alleged August 1989 attack.37
- Muchabarat — the Iraqi intelligence service to which Ostrovsky alleges Mossad passed warnings.38
- Al-Iskandariah explosives factory — the target of the alleged attack; the memoir’s plan was to take position on August 23, 1989, and strike the next day.39
- Project Babylon — Iraq’s supergun program Bull was working on40
Open Questions
- Could post-2003 access to Iraqi regime archives test Ostrovsky’s claim that the Mossad warned Iraq’s Muchabarat of attempts on Saddam Hussein’s life? It is the most operationally specific element of his account that the Mossad regarded Saddam as its “biggest asset in the area.”41
- “Fully bought members of the U.S. Congress” is a strong claim Ostrovsky does not name; any specific attribution here requires evidence independent of Ostrovsky.42
- Why did Ostrovsky omit this account from his first book? His memoir says he was asked to omit it and was never given an explanation; it supplies no basis for attributing a motive.43
Sources
- House of Commons, Hansard. Mr. Farzad Bazoft (Execution). 1990-03-15. HC Deb, vol. 169, cols. 667–671. Captured 2026-10-22.
- Ostrovsky, Victor. The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad’s Secret Agenda. First edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. ISBN 0-06-017635-0. Held electronic version.